Bio
I’m a development economist at the University of East Anglia, UK. I received my PhD from the University of Nottingham in 2010, working on development aid supervised by Oliver Morrissey. I then held a two-year ESRC postdoc at UEA, before joining as faculty. In aid, I have published on allocation, migration, taxation, and payment by results.
I now mainly use experimental and behavioural economics to study decision making, often with the help of The Field Lab, Uganda. The common thread is the external social influence on a person’s decisions. This includes the domains of risk taking, social preferences, and lying. One social influence I have returned to several times is language.
Publications
(with Ying-yi Hong)
Journal of Economic Psychology, 2023, 102658
Abstract (click to expand): Every year millions of students study at foreign universities, swapping one set of cultural surroundings for another. This may reveal whether measured preferences are fixed or flexible, whether they can be altered in the short run by moving country, or learning a new language. We disentangle these influences by measuring international students’ preferences. For Chinese students in the UK (who arrived up to five years previously) we randomise a survey’s language. We add reference groups in each country, doing the survey in the relevant language. Simple comparisons provide a causal estimate of language’s effect and observational estimates of differences by country, location and nationality. We find language has a large causal effect on a range of survey responses. The effect size is similar to differences by country or nationality (at 0.4 standard deviations), and larger than differences by location (at 0.1 standard deviations). Assimilation theories predict any movement in measured preferences for Chinese students in the UK would be towards those of UK students, even if they may be small. We do not find this. In Mandarin, Chinese students hardly differ from those in Beijing. Yet in English, they are not close to either Chinese students in Beijing or British students in the UK. This can be explained by a model of identity priming with monocultural subjects. For Chinese students in the UK, speaking English reduces the pull of a Chinese frame without increasing the pull of a British one. International students do not so much learn foreign preferences as learn to ignore old ones. Our reliance on mostly stated preferences enables a rich dataset covering many domains; future work is needed to see if such large effects are also found for a wide range of revealed preferences.
Replication data, and experimental scripts
Forthcoming Book chapter for the Encyclopedia of Experimental Social Science, part of the Elgar Encyclopedia, Social Sciences series
(with Ben D'Exelle & Arjan Verschoor)
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 182: 297-310, 2021
Abstract (click to expand): Risky choices often have a natural starting-point. For example, insurance-type decisions concern reducing risk while investment-type decisions concern increasing it. A recent reference-dependent utility model predicts such references influence behaviour. Stochastic references act as endowments, with riskier references leading to riskier choices. We test this prediction in an identical choice set using a between-subject design in rural Uganda. Subjects are subtly assigned to one of three reference lotteries. On average, those with riskier endowments risk half a standard deviation more coins. We also consider the effect of introducing a new stochastic reference. In a within-subject second round, we test whether a social signal acts as a competing reference. In our experiment, information on peers' choices is a stronger pull than the initial treatment effect. On average, subjects converge to the social signal by 0.37 for each unit of difference. Previous research focuses on the absence or presence of risk, allowing either the reference or prospect to be non-degenerate. Our results allow both to contain an element of risk, and show that the endowment effect can operate on the level of risk: risky choice is influenced by the riskiness of the reference.
Replication Data and Code, in Stata
(with Gabriele Restelli)
The World Economy, 44(5): 1281-1311, 2021
Abstract (click to expand): In recent years, donors have claimed to tackle the root causes of migration from low‐income countries using aid. While others have studied the effects of aid on regular migration, we test whether aid deters irregular migration to Italy using two innovative dependent variables: asylum applications and apprehensions at border. For asylum applications, the largest significant effect size implies we should expect one extra application for an additional $162,000 in bilateral aid. For border crossings, the only significant effect implies the marginal cost in bilateral aid is $1.8 million per deterred migrant. The conclusion that effect sizes are small is robust to different types of aid, measures of migration and various controls. We find robust evidence that irregular migration flows are significantly affected by conflict, poverty, and the pre‐existing stocks from that country. Comparing our results to the existing aid‐migration literature, we find similar effect sizes. The cost per deterred (regular) migrant is in the range $4‐7 million. Statistically significant estimates for the effect of aid on regular migration are only found for sub‐samples or specific specifications. In short, aid does not deter regular or irregular migration, so should be used for other purposes.
Coverage in The Economist
Policy Brief (2 pages)
Development Policy Review, 37(6):719-734, 2019
Abstract (click to expand): Payment by results is a relatively new way of giving development aid, where a recipient's performance against pre‐agreed measures determines the amount of aid they receive. It has proved popular, with most bilateral aid donors having at least experimented with the mechanism and the variety of measures stretching from individual health workers being paid for each procedure, to national governments being paid for students’ test scores. Given a lack of robust and systematic investigations of the effects of PbR, the paper uses the leading theoretical framework to synthesise the available evidence, asking whether payment by results works as intended. This allows a test of the framework and the evidence against each other. I synthesise the evidence from eight projects fully or partially funded by DFID, the recognised world leader on PbR. This represents the best evidence currently available, and is critically analysed using the leading theoretical framework that breaks each agreement into its constituent parts. I find no evidence that PbR leads to fundamentally more innovation or autonomy, with the overall range of success and failure broadly similar to other aid projects. This may partly be due to the current use of Payment by Results, with no readily identifiable examples of projects that truly meet the idealised PbR designs. Advocates of PbR may conclude the idea is yet to be tested. I argue PbR does not deal with the fundamental constraints that donors face, and so it is unsurprising that PbR is subject to the normal pressures that affect all aid spending. Donors would be sensible to limit themselves to either ‘small PbR’ (where the costs of PbR are minimised) or genuine ‘big PbR’ (where projects seek to maximise PBR's benefits). The current evidence shows that projects outside these two categories are worse than traditional forms of aid. Evidence for ‘small PbR’ is mixed, while there is no evidence for ‘big PbR’ as it has yet to be tried.
PDF: Free Version
(with Arjan Verschoor)
Journal of Development Economics, 129:47-57, 2017
Abstract (click to expand): Multilingualism is the global norm, but the implications of this for cooperation and public goods provision have not been studied before. We test whether the language in which a public goods game is played affects subjects' contributions amongst a bilingual population in eastern Uganda, finding that subjects contribute 30% more on average in the national language. This treatment effect is solely driven by those most associated with the local Gisu identity, for whom contributions are 43-74% higher in the national language. This difference fits with Gisu culture's high value on self-reliance and low value on reciprocity and cooperation, due to a violent history of intense competition over land. Language is thus shown to affect cooperation, but only for individuals who both have different latent norms and for whom language activates these norms.
Replication Data
Replication Code
Experimental Script
PDF: free version
World Bank Research Observer, 31(2): 290-319, 2016
Abstract (click to expand): Payment by Results (PbR), where aid is disbursed conditional upon progress against a pre-agreed measure, is becoming increasingly important for various donors. There are great hopes that this innovative instrument will focus attention on ultimate outcomes and lead to greater aid effectiveness by passing the delivery risk on to recipients. However, there is very little related empirical evidence, and previous attempts to place it on a sure conceptual footing are rare and incomplete. This article collates and synthesises relevant insights from a wide range of subfields in economics, providing a rich framework with which to analyze Payment by Results. I argue that the domain in which it dominates more traditional forms is relatively small and if it is used too broadly, many of the results it claims are likely to be misleading. The likelihood of illusory gains stems from the difficulty of using a single indicator to simultaneously measure and reward performance: 'once a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.’ This does not mean PbR should not be used (indeed it will be optimal in some settings), but it does mean that claims of success should be treated with caution.
Development Policy Review, 34(3): 365-383, 2016
Abstract (click to expand): There are influential studies that argue that foreign aid displaces domestic tax revenue when it is given in the form of grants. These claims are based on data that are deeply problematic: several different sources are amalgamated into one dataset, with no apparent checks on compatibility. In this article, a variety of econometric strategies are used to overcome these issues of data quality. The resulting weight of evidence points to a modest but positive effect on the part of foreign aid generally on domestic tax revenue. Fears over a negative effect for aid grants appear unwarranted, and are accounted for by the inappropriate use of data or endogeneity issues.
Replication Data
Replication Code
The World Economy, 38(5): 805–824, 2015
Abstract (click to expand): Indices of donor performance abound. Their recent popularity has occurred within the context of pessimism over aid's impact and optimism over the effect of changes in donor behaviour. Rankings of donor allocative performance aim to change donor behaviour, either through direct pressure on governments or indirectly through public engagement. The indices themselves rely on descriptive measures, and typically claim methodological superiority over positive alternatives due to their simplicity. However, there are two problems. First, measures do not seem robust to simple variations in methodology. Second, correlation amongst competing indices is low, leading to a host of contradictory judgements. This offers neither clear technical guidance nor consistent political pressure. The advantages and disadvantages of the approach are discussed, building upon the more general critique of aggregate indices. I suggest a graphical solution that embraces the advantages of the descriptive approach (including ease of public communication) while avoiding some of its major weaknesses (which typically stem from aggregation).
Replication Data
(with Oliver Morrissey & Alessia Isopi)
The Review of International Organizations, 7(3): 267-284, 2012
Abstract (click to expand): Since the late 1990s a selection on policy approach to aid was advocated such that more aid should be allocated to countries with good policies, but there is little evidence that this has occurred. This paper argues that donors may exercise selectivity over the aid modality. Specifically, multilateral donors will cede more recipient control over aid by granting more budget support to those recipients with better expenditure systems and spending preferences (towards the poor) aligned with the donor. We test this for European Commission and World Bank budget support over 1997–2009 and find some support. Both donors have given budget support to almost half of the countries they give aid, and it is usually a significant share of their aid. The principal determinants of receiving budget support are having a poverty reduction strategy in place, which can be considered a good indicator of aligned preferences, and indicators of government efficiency. These variables did not, however, influence the amount of budget support given. Multilateral donors have been more likely to give budget support to countries with aligned spending preferences and better quality systems, even if they have not reallocated the total aid envelope in that way.
Replication Data
(with Oliver Morrissey)
Journal of International Development 23(2): 165-180, 2011
Abstract (click to expand): This paper addresses the effect of aid loans and grants on tax effort using data for 82 developing countries over 1970–2005. We find no robust evidence for a negative effect of aid (grants or loans) on the tax/GDP ratio, other than a contemporaneous correlation, but find some evidence that the effect of grants on tax revenue is positive (if significant) since the mid 1980s and that grants tend to increase tax revenue over the medium term. For poor aid recipients, grants are to be preferred to loans because they create no debt and have no adverse fiscal effects.
World Development, 39(10): 1724–1734, 2011
Abstract (click to expand): The 4P framework (Poverty, Population, Policy, and Proximity) is introduced as a way of understanding a donor's aid allocation. We use the two-part model and examine the period 1982-2006. The results indicate that recent conclusions of increasing selectivity are misplaced for the seven major donors analyzed, who together represent the majority of development aid. Indeed, the effect of each of the commonly mentioned time-trends (selectivity, the end of the Cold War, and the commencement of the Global War on Terror) is much smaller than the role of donor heterogeneity, which appears sizeable and entrenched.
Replication Data
Replication Code
Working Papers
(with Ben D'Exelle and Arjan Verschoor)
Under Review, 1st Round Revision
(with Ying-Yi Hong)
Link to Early CBESS WP, with previous title
Replication Data
Pre-Ananlysis Plan
(with Josh Hill)
Early CSAE Conference WP
Pre-Ananlysis Plan
Twitter Presentation (CSAE)
Work in Progress
Partial Liars
(with Amrish Patel)
Early Stages
Policy
My work on Payment by Results in International Development has helped shaped policy and practice, especially in the UK. This happened somewhat by accident, with relevant academic papers leading to consultancy work, which now lead to more academic papers. For a quick introduction to my thinking for a general audience, see:
Consultancy
ELVAR, 2019-2021
A multi-year consultancy with ITAD, providing quality assurance and limited expert input. Evaluation of Payment by Results (ELVAR) for DFID’s Core Funding to UN Development, UN Humanitarian, and Red Cross & Red Crescent Movement agencies. For more see ITAD
Evaluating Results-Based Financing, 2019-2020
A short consultancy for Mokoro providing quality assurance and limited expert input. The project is for World Bank Evaluating Results-Based Financing in the Education Sector: Country Level Analysis, and looks at three countries.
Review of Payment by Results in DFID: Establishing the Evidence Base, 2017
A four month consultancy conducting a semi-systematic review of evidence of Payment by Results in International Development, and an investigation of how PBR evidence has been used within DFID. With colleagues at UEA, including Maren Duvendack and Brendan Whitty.
Evaluation of Results Based Aid in the Education Sector, Ethiopia, 2016
A short consultancy (c.10 days) overseeing a review of previous evaluation work, which led to a discovery of several fundamental problems with the data used. This fed into the project completion review.
Evaluation of Results Based Aid in the Education Sector, Rwanda, 2013-15
This was an exciting three-year project for DFID Rwanda, evaluating the effect of results based aid in Rwanda’s education system. This is one of the first evaluations of results based aid (a form of ‘cash on delivery’ aid). Upper Quartile led the bid, and I worked with colleagues at UEA. (c. 100 days) Final Report
Conceptual Basis for Payment by Results in International Development, 2013-2014
For DFID UK, a review of the conceptual basis for Payment by Results. This examines theoretically and conceptually new aid modalities. It deals with the interaction between donor and recipient, and makes use of relevant behavioural insights. (c. 20 days). There are several relevant outputs:
Evaluating Development Impact Bonds, 2014
For DFID UK, a study on Development Impact Bonds (DIBs). The first half of the report looks at their conceptual nature, using economic theory and related evidence (e.g. Social Impact Bonds, which have a longer history). The second half of the report looks at how they can be evaluated. Joint with Roger Drew. (30 days.)
International Aid and Domestic Tax Revenue, 2013-14
Following my 2011 publication examining the effects of aid grants and loans on domestic tax revenue, I returned to the subject for ICTD. The aim of the project was to investigate the source of contradictory results, predominately regarding aid grants, and led to a publication in the World Bank Research Observer (c. 80 days).
Aid and Government Spending, 2010-2011
Through CREDIT, the School of Economics, University of Nottingham. The work was for the AFD (L’Agence Française de Développement), and included 3 reports, which are currently not publicly available. My input was econometric. (c. 80 days)
Assorted
Website: This website was built using Hugo, relying heavily on Gautam Rao and Stefanie Stantcheva’s code. Feel free to copy my code, which you can find on my github site (links on the left).
